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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now widely accepted that the uneven record of U.N.
peacekeeping efforts in recent years is closely linked to the nature of
the mandates drawn up by the Security Council as the basis for U.N.
involvement. There can be no doubt, for example, that the Council
has frequently not taken into account the operational requirements
and implementation problems raised by individual resolutions.'
More critically, where a succession of mandates has lacked internal
consistency, as in the former Yugoslavia, it has damaged the overall
role of the United Nations.2 Even in those cases where military and
financial requirements have been properly identified before deploy-
ment in the field, member states have often proved reluctant to pro-
vide the necessary resources. Against these realities, it is hardly sur-
prising that academic observers and government and U.N. officials
have increasingly called for greater consistency and clarity of man-
dates.3
The focus of this Article, however, is less on how such clarity
may be achieved than on the reasons why the lack of clarity has
tended to persist. Focusing on the case of the former Yugoslavia, its
* Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. The author
would like to thank Hans-Christian Hagman for his very helpful comments during the prepara-
tion of this Article.
1. Lieutenant-General Francis Briquemont, a deeply frustrated Commander of U.N.
forces in the former Yugoslavia, commented shortly before his tour of duty ended in January
1994 that his mission had been plagued by "a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Secu-
rity Council, the will to execute these resolutions, and the means available to commanders in
the field." THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994: UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN
CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA 16 (James Mayall ed., 1996).
2- See infra Part III.A. (examining the background to the establishment of Bosnian "safe
areas" during the spring of 1993).
3. See, e.g., GARETH EVANS, COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR
THE 1990S AND BEYOND 109 (1993).
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central argument is that Security Council agreement on a particular
resolution does not necessarily mean underlying agreement about the
causes of conflict. It argues further that the increased resort to Chap-
ter VII resolutions-a distinctive feature of Security Council activi-
ties in the 1990s-does not reflect an emerging consensus among
U.N. member states about the basis for outside involvement in inter-
nal conflict or about what the nature of the response necessary to ad-
dress a given internal conflict should be. While not underplaying the
United Nations' own failings with regard to its management of large-
scale and complex field operations, this Article accepts the view that,
in terms of substantive policy output, "the failings of the United Na-
tions are the failings of its member states. 4 Moreover, the United
Nations has blurred distinctions once clearly understood and adopted
resolutions in a bid to demonstrate resolve rather than to address the
root causes of conflict. These failings have done considerable dam-
age to the United Nations as a potentially useful instrument of con-
flict management.
In exploring these issues, this Article will address three sets of
questions. First, in what ways has the context of U.N. involvement in
the field of peace and security changed since the late 1980s and, more
specifically, how has the Security Council sought to address the in-
creasing number of internal conflicts that have come to its attention?
Second, what lessons should one draw from the Security Council and
the U.N. involvement in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia? Fi-
nally, looking more broadly at U.N. field operations since 1992, what
conditions are necessary in order for U.N. action to have a construc-
tive and beneficial impact on conflict resolution and management ef-
forts?
II. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE EVOLUTION OF
U.N. PEACEKEEPING
A. The Cold War Period
By endowing the Security Council with "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and security"' and granting a right of
4. Sir David Hannay, The U.N.'s Role in Bosnia Assessed, 7 THE OXFORD INT'L REV. 4,9
(1996). Sir David Hannay served as Britain's Permanent Representative to the United Nations
in New York from 1990 to July 1995.
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
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veto on non-procedural matters to its five permanent members,6 the
founding U.N. members sought to take into account the realities of
power and hierarchy in international relations.7 The right of veto,
given to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet
Union and China, was a tacit recognition that it would not be enough
to merely admonish states to settle their disputes by peaceful means.
Above all, it implied that, without the collaboration of the major
powers in defense of common interests, the organization was unlikely
to be very effective in keeping the peace. As such, the system set up
by the Charter rejected the idea of "collective security" in its pure
and original form: a universal system of international security oper-
ating with a high degree of automaticity on the principle of "all for
one and one for all."8  Article 51 of the Charter, affirming the
"inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" of member
states, further implied that some conflicts could not be handled
within the U.N. framework. The "system" of the Charter, then,
based its effective functioning upon the assumption that the victori-
ous allies of the Second World War would continue to cooperate af-
ter the common enemy had been defeated. This did not happen,
however, and the emergence of rival power blocs after the war meant
that the system for maintaining international peace and security en-
visaged in the Charter was undermined almost from the outset.
The emergence of rival power blocs did not lead to a complete
paralysis of the United Nations in the field of international peace and
security. Starting in the late 1950s, the organization gradually found
for itself a distinct, albeit peripheral, role in the mitigation and con-
tainment of local conflicts world-wide. Many of these conflicts, as
Dag Hammarskjold had feared, might otherwise have brought the
Soviet Union into more direct conflict with the Western powers.!
This practice came to be known as "peacekeeping," a distinctive form
of third-party intervention involving the deployment of lightly-
6. Id. art. 23, para. 1; id. art. 27.
7. See generally Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and
Military Operations: The Past and Present, 7 DUKE J. COMW. & INT'L L. 3 (1996) (reviewing
the drafting of the U.N. Charter and the tensions inherent therein).
8. For a definitive treatment of the idea of collective security in relation to the establish-
ment of the United Nations, see INIs L. CLAUDE, JR., POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS (1962), especially chapter five. The veto provision also "represented a declaration
that the United Nations would not be drawn into any attempt-presumably foredoomed to fu-
tility and disaster-to implement the collective security principle in opposition to a great
power." Id. at 159.
9. See BRIAN UROUHART, HAMMARSKJOLD 256 (1973).
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equipped military personnel to a dispute with the consent of the par-
ties. The term itself is not mentioned in the charter. Yet, as Rosalyn
Higgins has stressed, "the Charter is an extraordinary instrument,
and.., a huge variety of possibilities are possible under it."'" Seen in
this light, the development of U.N. peacekeeping was a functional re-
sponse to the fact that, during the Cold War, the United Nations
could no longer rely on continued cooperation among the Allied
powers. Not surprisingly, the Security Council did not play an impor-
tant role in this development." Throughout the Cold War period, the
nature of the tasks undertaken by U.N. forces and the requirement of
consent from the parties generally meant that operations were car-
ried out in fairly benign and static operational environments. Under
such conditions, as in the case of the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF), deployed since June 1974 to oversee the
disengagement of forces on the Syrian front after the Yom Kippur
war, U.N. operations were often highly successful. 2
Yet, there were also important exceptions to the pattern of U.N.
Cold War operations described above, the most significant being the
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from July 1960 un-
til June 1964.13 Not only did the Congo operation threaten to bring
about the virtual collapse of the organization, it also foreshadowed
some of the problems which the United Nations would encounter, on
a much larger scale, after the end of the Cold War. In the Congo, the
United Nations intervened in an internal conflict and, although the
Secretary-General stressed the necessity of consent, minimum use of
force except in self-defense and strict impartiality,14 the United Na-
tions found it difficult not to become embroiled in the civil war. The
difficulties which ONUC encountered in trying to control domestic
violence and restore law and order were similar to those experienced
in Somalia, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia some thirty years
later.
10. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 184 (1994).
11. During the Cold War, armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council
did not, as a general rule, participate with peacekeeping troops on the ground.
12. For an analytical overview of U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1948, see THE
EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (William
J. Durch ed., 1993).
13. See generally William J. Durch, The U.N. Operation in the Congo, in THE EVOLUTION
OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (William J. Durch ed.,
1993).
14. See iL at 326-329.
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B. Developments After the Cold War: Internal Conflict and the
Resort to Chapter VII
For the United Nations, the most obvious consequence of the
end of superpower rivalry was that the Security Council ceased to be
subject to the decision-making paralysis which had hampered its ac-
tivities since the late 1940s.' 5 To many, this opened new possibilities
for the United Nations in the area of international security and was,
therefore, a source of considerable optimism." The rapid growth in
the number of operations launched by the organization after 1988
was testimony both to this renewed optimism and to the ability of the
Security Council to reach agreement on issues of common interest.
There was more to these changes, however, than just a growth in the
number of operations.
When the period since 1988 is viewed as a whole, post-Cold War
U.N. operations have been marked by two significant developments.
First, there has been a considerable increase in the number, scale and
types of missions given to peacekeepers.' Second, the United Na-
tions has become much more involved in attempts to contain, resolve
and address the consequences of conflicts within states. This in turn
has meant that, as a general trend, the physical environment in which
peacekeeping forces are deployed has become more volatile, complex
and dangerous. Indeed, in a growing number of cases, peacekeepers
have been obliged to work with only partial consent from warring
parties, and have also often been unable to identify "front lines" or
legitimate political authorities within the area of operations.' Not
only has this led to a dramatic rise in the number of fatalities sus-
tained by U.N. forces, 9 it has also led to calls for the United Nations
15. For a succinct account of the failure of the United Nations to "create the framework of
international security intended by its founders," see Michael Howard, The Historical Develop-
ment of the UN's Role in International Security, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE
UN's ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 63-80 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds.,
1993).
16. Such optimism was particularly pronounced at the first meeting ever of the Security
Council at the level of heads of state and government in New York in January 1992. See World
Leaders Optimistic on Future: U.N. Declaration, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 1,1992, at 13.
17. For useful data on the quantitative changes, see the Supplement to AN AGENDA FOR
PEACE at 6, U.N. Doc. DPI/1623IPKO, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.15 (1995). For a discussion of the
tasks and missions given to peacekeepers, see Mats R. Berdal, Whither U.N. Peacekeeping?,
281 ALDELPHI PAPER 3, 6-25 (1993).
18. For a more complete discussion see Berdal, supra note 17.
19. As of late 1994, there had been 130 fatalities in the United Nations Protective Force in
the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) alone. Interview with Ian Johnstone, Special Assistant
in Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, in New York (December 1996).
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to abandon past practices altogether in favor of a doctrine that would
allow for a much greater use of force. In effect, such a doctrine en-
visages an enforcement action that goes beyond "traditional
peacekeeping," but still falls short of classical war-fighting doctrines.'
What is significant in terms of the argument of this Article, however,
is that these calls for more "robust" or "muscular" peacekeeping
were matched, in the years between 1992 and 1995, by a real ten-
dency on the part of the Security Council to weaken the requirement
of consent as a basis for U.N. involvement and to place an increasing
number of missions (and resolutions) on a Chapter VII footing.
While the Security Council passed two Chapter VII resolutions in the
whole of the 1980s, it passed forty-eight in 1993 and 1994 alone, and
the majority of these concerned internal conflicts." But there is a fur-
ther and more significant consideration. Not only has the Security
Council increasingly resorted to Chapter VII as a basis for action in
internal conflict, but, as Christopher Greenwood has noted, the for-
mal determination of a "threat to international peace and security"
under Article 39 of the Charter has increasingly come to be treated
more as a procedural than a substantive hurdle.2 Evidence of this
can be seen not only with regard to Somaliae but also, as will be
shown, in the numerous resolutions passed concerning the war in the
former Yugoslavia.
III. THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
From late 1991 until the summer of 1995, consensus among the
permanent five members of the Security Council (as well as the prin-
cipal troop-contributing countries not on the Council) about the
U.N.'s role in the former Yugoslavia under the aegis of the United
As of early 1996, there have been 410 fatalities in U.N. peacekeeping operations in the former
Yugoslavia. See id.
20. For views from a proponent of this "middle-ground" approach, see Richard Con-
noughton, Time To Clear The Doctrine Dilemma, 21 JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY 19 (1994).
21. See Sally Morphet, The Influence of States and Groups of States on and in the Security
Council and General Assembly, 1980-94,21 REv. INT'L STUDIES 435,461 (1995).
22. See Christopher Greenwood, Legal Constraints on U.N. Military Operations, IISS
STRATEGIC COMMENTS, March 22,1995.
23. See S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992) (determining that the "magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Soma-
lia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assis-
tance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security" and, acting accordingly, decided
to take "[action] under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations... [in order] to es-
tablish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Soma-
ia.").
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Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) was confined to three basic
objectives: (1) relieving as far as possible the humanitarian conse-
quences of the war; (2) containing the conflict to the territories of the
former Yugoslavia; and (3) encouraging and facilitating a negotiated
solution among the parties.24 These objectives have been seen by
many, quite legitimately, as having been too limited and largely reac-
tive in nature.' Yet, these objectives always reflected deeper disa-
greements among the outside powers about the origins and nature of
the conflict. Indeed, as William Shawcross observed in December
1994, the Western powers "never defined a political objective for
former Yugoslavia." 6 And, as Britain's Permanent Representative to
the United Nations during much of the conflict has commented more
recently:
From the very beginning of hostilities in Bosnia the one common
point amongst all the external parties was their determination not
to be drawn into the fighting themselves nor, despite the undoubted
primary responsibility of Milosevic and of the Bosnian Serbs for the
outbreak of fighting and for the brutality and inhumanity with
which it was prosecuted, to see this as a black and white issue call-
ing for enforcement action. There was thus a clear unwillinness to
treat it in a parallel way to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
It is against the background of this political reality that the
U.N.'s concern about maintaining impartiality as the determinant of
operational activity for U.N. soldiers in the field must be understood.
In terms of the basic objectives outlined above, UNPROFOR re-
mained essentially a "peacekeeping" mission, however unsatisfactory
that term has been in describing its operations in the midst of an on-
going war.t The central difficulty in Bosnia, however, was precisely
24. See Impact of a Unilateral United States Lifting of the Arms Embargo on the Govern-
ment of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 3rd Cong.,
18 (1994) (statement of Major-General Rupert Smith, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom).
General Smith, who served as U.N. Force Commander in Bosnia from 1994 to 1995, testified
while serving as Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations/Security) at the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence. For the background to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, see generally
SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR
(1995). A good account may also be found in LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LrITLE, THE DEATH
OF YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
25. See, e.g., Pretending About Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1993, at A19.
26. William Shawcross, Don't Blame U.N. Personnel for Bosnia Failures, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., December 3,1994, at 8.
27. Hannay, supra note 4, at 5.
28. My comments are confined to UNPROFOR's role in Croatia and Bosnia.
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that the war continued in spite of the United Nation's presence. At
the same time, new resolutions, usually aimed at addressing specific
contingencies arising in the field, were passed by the Council at an
alarming rate.29 Meanwhile, divisions among the external powers
persisted, making UNPROFOR's role on the ground increasingly dif-
ficult to sustain.3'
Although UNPROFOR struggled hard between 1992 and 1995
to reconcile the tensions inherent in its complex and contradictory
mandates, it remained under constant and conflicting pressure from
member states to take more forceful action without actually altering
the peacekeeping basis of its mandate. More often than not, the term
"peace enforcement" was used in discussions about the United Na-
tions and Bosnia "to cover the desire to go to war without making the
hard political and military choices that war requires."3 A draft re-
port, produced by senior U.N. officials on the future of the mission in
May 1995, succinctly summarized the dilemmas which had by then
become acute:
While the function UNPROFOR was tasked to implement was
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
the resolution determining its deployment assumed normal
peacekeeping rules of engagement. UNPROFOR's mandate be-
came further complicated by resolutions referring to Chapter VII
for security and freedom of movement purposes, without clearly
defining the tasks or ramifications emanating from them. Finally,
the introduction of the safe area mandate by the Council in Resolu-
tion 836 (1993) has brought the Force to the edge of an almost un-
tenable balance between its impartiality as a peacekeeping force
and the use of force.
32
To understand how these tensions arose and how, with the ter-
mination of UNPROFOR's mission in 1995, they were eventually re-
solved, it is necessary to consider certain key aspects of the
UNPROFOR experience more closely.
29. As of October 5, 1996, there have been 99 Security Council resolutions and 102 Presi-
dential Statements on the former Yugoslavia. The latest was October 1, 1996, and involved the
lifting of economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of
Sprska. See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3700th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1074 (1996).
30. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, UNFINISHED PEACE: REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS 55-68 (1996).
31. Shashi Tharoor, Should U.N. Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?, SURVIVAL, Winter
1995-96, at 52, 60.
32. Draft quoted in Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/444 (1995).
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A. Security Council Resolution 836 and the Establishment of "Safe
Areas" in Bosnia
Security Council Resolution 836 regarding the establishment of
"safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina marked a critical point in the
United Nations' involvement in Bosnia. It is instructive therefore to
look at the circumstances of its adoption carefully. This resolution
illustrates, perhaps more clearly than any other decision by the Secu-
rity Council between 1992 and 1995, the adverse effects on the con-
duct of U.N. field operations of competing political pressures and of
the differing perceptions of interests among permanent members of
the Security Council. To that extent, this resolution also highlights
the predicament in which the United Nations in New York and the
UNPROFOR leadership in the field found themselves in seeking to
carry out contradictory mandates.
In March and April 1993, Bosnian Serb forces intensified their
attacks on parts of eastern Bosnia controlled by the Bosnian govern-
ment." The vulnerability of these areas was cruelly exposed by the
continuing and indiscriminate Serbian bombardment of Bosnian
Muslim enclaves-especially around Cerska, Srebrenica, Zepa and
Gorazde-all resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties.34
Throughout April, as Bosnian Serb military operations continued,
American pressure for action to "punish Serb aggression" intensi-
fied.3 ' During the 1992 presidential election campaign, candidate Bill
Clinton had strongly hinted that such action would be taken.36 Ac-
cordingly, the Clinton administration only extended lukewarm sup-
port to the Vance-Owen peace plan once Clinton entered office in
early 1993."7 As the situation deteriorated in eastern Bosnia in March
and April, administration officials began to press more openly for a
"lift and strike" strategy, i.e., lifting the arms embargo as it applied to
the Bosnian government combined with "compensatory air strikes to
33. JAN WiLLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECoRD OF A WAR CRIME 71-
98 (1996). This book is among the best to have emerged concerning Western policy and the
role of the United Nations in Bosnia.
34. See SILBER & LrrrLE, supra note 24, at 293-305.
35. See Elaine Sciolino, In Congress, Urgent Calls for Action Against Serbs, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 20, 1993, at A9; Gwen Ifill, Clinton Considers Air Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1993, at
Al.
36. See Mats R. Berdal, Fateful Encounter: The United States and U.N. Peacekeeping,
SURVIVAL, Spring 1994, at 30,35-36.
37. See SILBER & LrrrLE, supra note 24, at 319-24; WOODWARD, supra note 24, at 324.
On the initially highly ambiguous attitude of the administration to the peace plan see Elaine
Sciolino, Christopher Leery of Bosnia Accord, N.Y. TIvES, Jan. 22,1993, at Al.
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prevent the Serbs from overrunning the Bosnians while the Bosnians
were being armed."' The strategy did not envisage, however, the de-
ployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia. Indeed, as David Hannay
later observed, the Clinton administration had a "mandate from the
elections to be more muscular and more overtly pro-Bosnian while
being just as determined as the Bush administration had been to
avoid the involvement of U.S. ground troops."39
As fighting intensified, a concerted attempt was made by ad-
ministration officials to enlist allied support for the "lift and strike"
option.' European governments did not, on the whole, share Ameri-
can views on the lifting of the embargo, as foreign ministers of the
European Union made clear at a meeting in Denmark on April 25,
1993.41 Britain and France were most concerned about the U.S.
stance, not least due to the large contingents of soldiers each country
had deployed with UNPROFOR in Bosnia. In early May 1993, Sec-
retary of State Warren Christopher made a six-day trip to European
capitals in order to "sound out" allies on the "lift and strike" option."
The trip, however, only highlighted divisions among the allies. In
particular, it heightened British and French concerns about the direc-
tion of U.S. policy, especially the growing calls for large-scale air
strikes against Serbian positions. Thus, it was partly in order to fore-
stall what was perceived to be mounting pressure for "lift and strike"
that Britain and France came to argue in favor of designating several
Bosnian-controlled towns as "safe areas."43 Adding to the pressure
38. Interview by Robert MacNeil with Warren Christopher, Secretary of State of the
United States, The MacNeiVLehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, June 1, 1993), avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
39. Hannay, supra note 4, at 6.
40. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 24, at 318-19; see also R.W. Apple, Jr., Clinton Says US
Must Harden Line Toward the Serbs, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27,1993, at Al.
41. See Controversy Over Suggestions of Lifting of Arms Embargo to Ally Supplies to
Bosnian Muslims, News Digest for April 1993, KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 39,426
(1993).
42. Daniel Williams, US Confident Reluctant Europe Will Accept Clinton's Bosnia Plan,
WASH. POST, May 9,1993, at A27.
43. This information is based primarily on private interviews with officials conducted in
New York and London in November of 1994 and May of 1995. Further details of these inter-
views can be obtained by contacting the author. As Elaine Sciolino perceptively observed,
British and French support for the creation of "safe areas" was in effect a "counter strategy" to
American pressure. See Elaine Sciolino, Bosnia's Serbs Smirk, and Keep Shooting, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1993, at Al. Against this background of disunity, the very fact that the United States
had no intention of providing ground troops and had effectively rejected the Vance-Owen plan
made the "safe area" concept increasingly attractive as a compromise option that would restore
at least a semblance of unity to the activities of the outside powers. See also HONIG & BOTH,
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for action were the strong and persistent calls from the non-aligned
groups for action to be taken against the Bosnian Serb army, whose
activities were progressively destroying Muslim communities
throughout Bosnia.'
Against this background of continued fighting and American
and non-aligned pressure for more decisive action, the Security
Council declared on May 6 that the towns of Zepa, Tuzla, Sre-
brenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Bihac "and their surroundings
should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and
should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act."4
On May 22, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Spain also
agreed at a meeting in Washington, D.C. to a "Joint Action Plan" in
which the creation of the "safe areas" was a central element.4 This
did not, however, turn out to provide an adequate respite for negotia-
tions to proceed. A tenuous cease-fire collapsed with a new upsurge
in fighting in late May, and the Security Council "decided to ensure
full respect for the safe areas"47 by adopting Resolution 836. Specifi-
cally, Security Council Resolution 836, adopted with two abstentions
on June 4, decided to extend the
mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas re-
ferred to in Resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks against the safe
areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of mili-
tary or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key
points on the ground.4
To this end, the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR ...
acting in self-defense, to take the necessary measures, including the
use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any
one of the parties or to armed incursions into them... ,,,49 and de-
cided that
Member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations
supra note 33, at 111 ("In need of a quick solution, Britain and the U.S. turned, in an instance
of willy-nilly diplomacy, towards the safe-area concept.")
44. See HONIG & BOTH, supra note 33, at 108-113.
45. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993).
46. See "Safe Areas" Plan, News Digest for May 1993, KEESrNG'S RECORD OF WORLD
EVENTs 39,469 (1993).
47. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993).
48. Id. para. 5.
49. Id. para. 9.
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or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security
Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-
General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use
of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of
its mandate set out in paragraph 5 and 9 above!"
This wording raised serious concerns both at the U.N. headquar-
ters in New York and among UNPROFOR commanders, who feared
that the sponsoring states were passing a critical resolution without
regard to its operational consequences. In particular, it was felt that
without an adequate number of troops, the "safe areas" would be im-
possible to defend in accordance with the apparent requirement of
the operative paragraphs of the resolution. Partly in order to clarify
the operational implications, but also acutely aware of the difficulties
it would encounter in trying to raise additional troops, senior officials
in the Secretariat raised their concerns with the Security Council in a
meeting held in New York on June 7, 1993.1 In addition to the lack
of troops (none of the sponsoring countries were prepared to promise
an increase in their contingents), UNPROFOR commanders in the
field were also concerned about the lack of provisions for demilita-
rizing the safe areas-a necessary first step for preventing military ac-
tivity within the safe areas.
At the meeting on June 7, the Secretariat arranged for an oral
presentation to the Security Council outlining the findings of a
"preliminary military staff study" by UNPROFOR that called for
32,000 additional troops in order "to credibly implement the safe ar-
eas concept." The reaction from members, notably Britain and
France, was swift and negative, emphasizing their preference for a
"light minimum" option which had been drawn up earlier by France
and which envisaged the deployment of only approximately 5000
troops.' As for the wording of Resolution 836, it was made clear that
50. Id. para. 10.
51. This and the information in the following paragraph is based on private interviews with
and information obtained from officials from the United Nations, troop-contributing countries
and Security Council members. The interviews were conducted in Zagreb and Sarajevo in No-
vember 1994 and New York in April and May of 1995. Further details of these interviews can
be obtained by contacting the author. Much useful detail and analysis is also found in Hans-
Christian Hagman, UN-NATO Operational Co-operation in Peacekeeping 1992-1995 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, King's College London, University of London) (on file with
the Department of War Studies, King's College London).
52. The French paper outlining this option was presented to Russia, the United States and
Britain on May 10, 1993. See Note Verbale Dated 19 May 1993 From the Permanent Represen-
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the phrase "to deter attacks against the safe areas" (operative para-
graph 6) had deliberately been chosen over "to defend" and, simi-
larly, that "to promote withdrawal of military and paramilitary
forces" (operative paragraph 5) had been chosen over "ensure or en-
force." Preference was expressed by the permanent Council mem-
bers for a "gradual build-up" in the safe areas and it was stressed that
UNPROFOR's "deterrent capacity" was to derive from its mere
presence in the safe areas rather than from its military strength.53
Thus, the sponsoring powers did not seriously contemplate the en-
forcement of heavy weapons exclusion zones. As for demilitarizing
Bosnian Government troops within the safe areas, UNPROFOR
should "seek assurances" and, if possible, negotiate "voluntary
agreements" with the Bosnian Government.
By the time the "safe areas" came under sustained attack again
by Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, even the "light minimum" option of
1993 was not being met. Lacking military resources and with national
governments anxious to avoid casualties among their own troops,
thinly dispersed U.N. forces throughout Bosnia were repeatedly hu-
miliated and were unable to implement the mandate given to them.
M
As Shashi Tharoor pointedly observed with respect to the role of the
United Nations in Bosnia and, no doubt, with Resolution 836 in
mind, "[t]he end objectives of Security Council resolutions have been
framed in terms that would require war to fulfil them, while the
world has clearly committed neither the political will nor the re-
sources to conduct warfare for those ends." 5
B. The Termination of U.N. Presence and the Use of Force
In the debate about the United Nations' role in Bosnia, the ar-
gument has been made that Chapter VII resolutions explicitly al-
lowed for "all necessary means" to be employed and that the failure
to act more forcefully had nothing to do with any restrictions im-
posed by the mandate. This view, however, overlooks an important
tative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/25800 (1993); see also HONIG & BOTH, supra note 33, at
111.
53. See Hagman, supra note 51.
54. See INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD., STRATEGIC SURVEY 1994/95 93-105 (1995);
INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD., STRATEGIC SURVEY 1993/94 98-106 (1994).
55. Tharoor, supra note 31, at 59-60.
56. See Paul Wiliams & Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law, in WITH No PEACE TO
KEEP ... UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 34-
41 (Ben Cohen & George Stamkoski eds., 1995).
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feature of Security Council decisionmaking with respect to the con-
flict in the former Yugoslavia. It also involves a misreading (or at
least it conveniently ignores certain aspects) of the events leading up
to the termination of UNPROFOR's mission in the summer of 1995.
While it is true that several resolutions sanctioned the use of
force in defense of specific mandates, the Security Council was also
always careful to reaffirm earlier resolutions that did not allow the
use of force." Indeed, as far as those charged with implementing de-
cisions on the ground were concerned,
no single Security Council resolution on Bosnia [could] be read in
isolation from the others. Even in those resolutions that allowed
for the use of force, the Security Council reaffirmed its previous
resolutions on UNPROFOR; in other words, it did not want
UNPROFOR to abandon its existing mandates in order to under-
take new ones. UNPROFOR thus had the difficult challenge of
reconciling its authority to use force with its obligation to perform
all the other tasks mandated by the Security Council-tasks which
required the cooperation of, and deployment amongst, all parties to
conflict.5
The nature of UNPROFOR's disengagement from Bosnia also
raises some additional questions about the use of force and
peacekeeping. UNPROFOR's involvement in Bosnia came to an
end with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement for Bosnia
and Herzegovina in late 1995." It has since been replaced by a much
more robust Implementation Force (IFOR) operating "under the di-
rection and political control of the North Atlantic Council, through
the NATO chain of command.. 'W To many observers, the extensive
bombing campaign initiated by NATO in late August and early Sep-
tember 1995 is seen as supporting the argument that a more forceful
option was always available to UNPROFOR, and that it was the be-
lated air campaign which finally "produced the results" that allowed
a peace agreement to be reached." There can be little doubt that the
57. See S.C. Res. 859, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3269th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/859 (1993).
58. Tharoor, supra note 31, at 59.
59. See Letter Dated 29 November 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A1501790 (1995).
60. Id. at 7.
61. Ian Williams, The Constraints of Bureaucracy, in WrI No PEACE TO KEEP ...
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 29-32 (Ben
Cohen & George Stamkoski eds., 1995).
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weakening of the military position of the Serbs allowed for progress
at the negotiating table. What should not be forgotten, however, is
that before the air campaign started, U.N. troops had been with-
drawn from the areas of most acute vulnerability, i.e., the weapon
collection points around Sarajevo and Gorazde, the only remaining
safe areas in eastern Bosnia (Zepa and Srebrenica having already
fallen to Serbian forces in July).2 At the same time, British and
French forces deployed a Rapid Reaction Force with, for the first
time, artillery support, on Mount Igman near Sarajevo.63 Taken to-
gether, these developments meant that the ground was prepared for a
transition from peacekeeping to enforcement. The necessary steps,
which hitherto had been resisted, were taken for enforcement action
to proceed.
One may legitimately ask whether peacekeeping was ever the
right instrument to be applied to the particular case of the former
Yugoslavia.' It is no secret that in 1992 senior U.N. officials were al-
ready deeply skeptical about involving the United Nations in the con-
flict after the failure of European Community attempts to mediate.65
Many of the concerns expressed at the time were borne out by later
events. A comprehensive review by the United Nations of its entire
operation in May 1995, regarded as unhelpful by key Council mem-
bers, accurately spelled out the situation in which the United Nations
had gradually been placed:
UNPROFOR remains deployed in a war situation where, after
more than three years, there is still no peace to keep. Its position is
further complicated by the fact that its original peace-keeping
mandate, which cannot be implemented without the cooperation of
the parties, has gradually been enlarged to include elements of en-
forcement, which cause it to be seen as a party to the conflict ....
As a result of these contradictions, UNPROFOR now finds itself
62. See Agreements on Bosnia Signed, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1995, at 4, 5; see also Chris
Hedges, Conflict in the Balkans: Serb Forces Shell U.N. Peacekeepers at 2d "Safe" Area, N.Y.
TiMES, July 15, 1995, at Al; Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., para. 911, U.N. Doc. A/SO/1 (1995).
63. See INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD., STRATEGICSURvEY 1995/96 130 (1996).
64. See Rosalyn Higgins, The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia, 69 INT'L AFF.
465 (1993).
65. This is the case especially with respect to Bosnia. See the report drawn up by Marrack
Goulding after his fact-finding mission to Bosnia in May 1992 where he recommended against a
U.N. peacekeeping operation on the grounds that the situation was too "dangerous, violent and
confused." The findings of the report were incorporated into Further Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/23900 (1992).
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obstructed, targeted by both sides, denied resupply restricted in its
movements, [and] subject to constant criticism ....
It seems that during most of its time in the former Yugoslavia,
the United Nations served the "international community" by acting
as a substitute for lack of agreement and coherent policy towards the
conflict. It is increasingly recognized, at least in some of the Euro-
pean capitals, that against this background the United Nations' per-
formance in the former Yugoslavia was far less catastrophic than is
often portrayed.67 More significantly, it is also accepted that, in the
words of Pauline Neville-Jones, "the failure of the United Nations
had partly to do with a widening mismatch between mission and ca-
pability but also with serious underlying transatlantic disagreement
about the direction of policy."" Such acknowledgments may not,
however, undo the damage that has been done to the United Nation's
role as a potentially effective instrument of conflict management.
Reflecting on the UNPROFOR experience while it was still under-
way, Rosalyn Higgins concluded that "[a]ll the lessons of the neces-
sary conditions for U.N. peacekeeping seem to have been forgotten;
and all the alternative possibilities under the Charter ignored. U.N.
peacekeeping, together with collective measures under Chapter VII
of the Charter, appears to be entering a period of deep incoher-
ence."
69
IV. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL UNITED
NATIONS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
What, then, are some of the broader lessons that can drawn from
the experience of U.N. operations after the Cold War? Specifically,
what are the conditions that need to be in place for U.N. involvement
to have a constructive and positive bearing on efforts to manage and
resolve conflict? Five sets of conditions may be identified: (1) main-
taining a clear distinction between consent-based operations and en-
forcement; (2) continuing political support; (3) clarity of mandate; (4)
quality of personnel; and (5) adequate financial and military re-
66. Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions
982 (1995) and 987 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., paras. 68-69, U.N. Doc. S/1995/444 (1995).
67. Pauline Neville-Jones, Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia, SURVIVAL,
Vol. 38, No. 4, 1996. Ms. Neville-Jones served as Political Director at the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office of the United Kingdom at the time of the Dayton negotiations.
68. Id.
69. HIGGINS, supra note 10, at 181.
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sources. For the purpose of this analysis it is useful to look at each of
these in turn, even though in practice they cannot easily be separated.
A. Distinguishing Between Consent-Based Activities and
Enforcement70
Although the United Nations clearly deserves some criticism for
the management of its field operations in recent years, its senior offi-
cials have rightly stressed that in the absence of a firm willingness to
impose a solution on warring parties from the outside, the limitations
upon the use of force by peacekeepers remain considerable.7
Although consent in civil wars will never be absolute, it is the
conscious promotion of it which distinguishes peacekeeping from en-
forcement. As the experience of UNOSOM II in Somalia in the
summer and autumn of 1993 clearly showed, any attempt to combine
these two sets of activities in one operation is certain to destabilize
the operational environment in which forces are deployed.' The key
reason for this is that
the logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises
that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics
of the latter are incompatible with the political process that
peacekeeping is intended to facilitate.?
To reassert the importance of clearly separating peacekeeping
(or, more broadly, consent-based operations) from war-fighting is not
tantamount to ruling out enforcement as an option available to the
international community. Indeed, as indicated above, peacekeeping
may have always been an inappropriate instrument in the particular
case of Bosnia. Yet, enforcement action requires political will (and
willingness to accept casualties), as well as proper military resources
to prosecute it. These conditions did not obtain in the case of the
former Yugoslavia.
70. For detailed discussions of the law of host-state consent and the difficulties of obtain-
ing consent in the former Yugoslavia see, respectively, David Wippman, Military Intervention,
Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209 (1996) and
Christine Gray, Case Study: Host-State and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 241 (1996).
71. See Tharoor, supra note 31, at 56-57.
72. See Mats R. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars, 303 ADELPHI
PAPER 5,25-32 (1996).
73. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., para. 35,
U.N. Doe. S/1995/1 (1995).
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B. Continuing Political Support
The second condition is that of continuing political support and
broad international consensus behind the decision to establish and
sustain an operation. Such support comes from the Security Council
and needs to be reaffirmed and transmitted to the field, both to the
heads of the mission entrusted with implementation and to the par-
ties on the ground. It was manifestly absent in the case of the former
Yugoslavia. By contrast, the U.N. operation in Cambodia (UNTAC)
between 1992 and 1993 benefited greatly from the broad interna-
tional consensus behind the Paris Peace Accord, and the operation
itself enjoyed solid support from key members of the Security Coun-
cil. '4  Similarly, during the U.N. operation in Mozambique
(ONUMOZ), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG), Aldo Ajello, enjoyed continuous support from the Council,
as well as from troop-contributing countries!' The political coalition
built up in support of the peace process in Central America in the
late 1980s and early 1990s was also sufficiently strong to "cushion"
the effect of structural and operational weaknesses evident in the im-
plementation phase.6
C. Clarity of Mandate
The third condition is that of clarity of mandate and, equally im-
portant, a readiness to take account of the mandate's operational im-
plications. Such "clarity" is needed in order to ensure that the vari-
ous tasks given to complex missions are internally consistent and that
political objectives are capable of translation into realizable goals on
the ground. Clarity is also needed to ensure that relations, in terms
of tasks, as well as command and control arrangements, between the
United Nations and other organizations are properly spelled out.
Beyond these vital requirements, however, for several reasons clarity
74. See Mats R. Berdal & Michael Leifer, Cambodia, in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM
1991-1994: UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND
SOMALIA 25,32 (James Mayall ed., 1996).
75. Interview with Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and
ONUMOZ staff, in Maputo, Mozambique (February 1994); see also STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAIT
UND POLITIK, WINNING THE PEACE: CONCEPT AND LESSONS LEARNED OF POST-CONFLIcr
PEACEBUILDING 13, 15 (1996) (providing a case study of the peacekeeping operation in Mo-
zambique especially focusing on the role of Aldo Ajello, the former Secretary-General in Mo-
zambique).
76. For this and other aspects of the Central American peace process, see Stephen Baranyi
& Liisa North, Stretching the Limits of the Possible: United Nations Peacekeeping in Central
America, AURORA PAPER No. 15 (1992).
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cannot mean that the drafting process should remove all ambiguities.
First, nearly all Security Council resolutions reflect a measure of po-
litical compromise which manifests itself in the way a mandate is
drafted. If a requirement of complete clarity is demanded, very few
resolutions are likely to pass. Second, and more importantly in this
context, senior U.N. officials in the field have frequently stressed the
value of operating with mandates that allow them to "flexibly inter-
pret" conditions and requirements on the ground.' At times, this has
led to controversy. For example, for the purposes of the peace proc-
ess in Mozambique (specifically, the elections which ONUMOZ was
charged with overseeing), Aldo Ajello was determined to turn
RENAMO, which had fought a brutal guerrilla war against the gov-
ernment, into a viable political party. The amount of money and
support given to RENAMO was criticised from various quarters, but
was deemed by Ajello to be within the overall mandate of
ONUMOZ and vital to the success of the operation.'8
D. Quality of Personnel
The quality of senior personnel in a U.N. mission, especially the
Force Commander and the SRSG, can be critical to the outcome of
an operation. In those operations where the United Nations can
plausibly claim to have been successful, the role of leadership in the
field (especially the ability to interpret mandates flexibly and use the
available resources effectively) has indeed been vital. This was true,
for example, in the U.N. operations in both Mozambique and Cam-
bodia.
E. Adequate Financial and Military Resources
Finally, mandates cannot be implemented without adequate fi-
nancial and military resources. When, for whatever reason, resources
have not been forthcoming, tensions have invariably arisen between
the United Nations' declaratory commitments and realities on the
ground. Margaret Anstee, SRSG in Angola, declared at the time of
the elections in September 1992 that through ingenuity and good will
UNAVEM H had been able to organize multiparty elections in a
77. Based on private interviews with and information obtained from United Nations offi-
cials that have been based in former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cambodia and Mozambique. Further
details can be obtained by contacting the author.
78. Interview with Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in
Maputo, Mozambique (Feb. 1994). Further details can be obtained by contacting the author.
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country nearly two-thirds the size of Western Europe.79 The subse-
quent relapse of Angola into civil war showed that ingenuity and
good will, which Anstee undoubtedly displayed in rich measure, are
not, by themselves, sufficient to guarantee a mission's success. The
case of Angola from 1991 to 1992 is only the most glaring example of
this. Since 1991, inadequate support, both financially and logistically,
have resulted in a number of operations coming perilously close to
collapse or serious derailment."
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that it would be wrong to view the
United Nations' failure to satisfy the expectations placed on it in re-
cent years simply as the fault of the organization itself. While the
United Nations' record after the Cold War still leaves much to be de-
sired, the difficulties encountered by the United Nations, in terms of
substantive policy outcomes, clearly reflect an international system
which continues to be divided by conflicts of interest and value, even
though the workings of U.N. organs may no longer be paralyzed by
the East-West rivalry. Indeed, as James Mayall points out, the host
of organizational problems and challenges facing the United Nations
"mask[s] a deeper uncertainty within the governments of major pow-
ers about the kind of international order they wish to support.""1
There is a further issue, however, that needs to be considered in
light of the above discussion. The U.N. Charter was drafted against
the background of the experience of the Second World War and, as
Rosalyn Higgins has observed,
[T]he Charter provisions dealing with the use of force ... were
formulated to address the problem of military hostilities between
states. In the event, much of post Second World War military his-
tory has been about different uses of force-the employment or en-
couragement of irregulars by one state against another, guerrilla
movements, national liberation movements, terrorism.u
With the end of the Cold War, violence in the international sys-
tem, especially after the collapse of multiethnic federal state struc-
79. See Berdal, supra note 17. For an excellent and personal account of the U.N. opera-
tion in Angola see MARGARET JOAN ANSTEE, ORPHAN OF THE COLD WAR: THE INSIDE
STORY OFTHE COLLAPSE OF THE ANGOLAN PEACE PROCESS, 1992-93 (1996).
80. For further discussion, see Berdal, supra note 17, especially chapter two.
81. THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-94, supra note 1, at 21.
82. HIGGINS, supra note 10, at 239.
1996] SECURITY COUNCIL, PEACEKEEPING, AND INTERNAL CONFLICT 91
tures, has shifted more markedly towards the sub-state level." While
civil wars and ethno-nationalist violence were also widespread during
the Cold War era, the "international community" has chosen,
through a variety of means, to become much more directly involved
in addressing the political and humanitarian consequences of such
conflicts. Although this may only be a temporary phenomenon, the
United Nations is at present structurally ill-equipped to address the
problems generated by this shift. Moreover, member states have
shied away from a more radical discussion of how the United Nations
may effectively intervene in internal conflicts. This fact should come
as no surprise. A majority of member states, above all those from the
non-Western world, have tended to regard such discussions as poten-
tially subversive to the fundamentally state-centric approach of the
Charter, and, therefore, also as a threat to the notion of sovereign
equality and the principle of non-intervention. Evidence of such con-
cerns can be found in recent attempts by the non-aligned group to
"work against the expansion of the Security Council's power" and to
resist efforts of "the permanent members to enlarge the scope of the
Security Council."" The recent record of U.N. involvement in inter-
nal conflict has, if anything, reinforced such concerns and prompted
member states to reassert the importance of basing action firmly, as
the Agenda for Peace puts it, "within the framework and provisions
of the Charter."" Reconciling these tensions will continue to present
the United Nations, the Security Council, and member states more
generally, with major challenges in the post Cold War era.
83. For an overview of internal conflicts as of 1995, see Michael Brown, Introduction, in
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 1, 4-7, (Michael Brown ed., 1996).
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sion, see Mats R. Berdal, The United Nations in International Relations, 22 REV. INT'L STUD. 95
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